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assignment is to the government, the name of the assignee may be
used in a suit even at law.' No assignment which transfers the
rights of seamen in prizes, 2 or savors .of maintenance or any illegality is a valid consideration. 3 The maker of a note waives no
defence, which existed prior to its assignment, by his promise to the
assignee to pay it.*
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In the Circuit Court of the United States, Westerm -Districtof
Pennsylvania. NYovember Term, 1853.
GARRET VAN METTER VS. ROBERT MITCHELL.
An action lies at Common Law in a free State by the owner of a fugitive slave,
against one who knowingly harbors and conceals the latter; and the Act of Congress of 1793, has not destroyed this right. Jones vs. Van Zandt, 2 McLean, 603,
dissented from.

This was a motion in arrest of judgment.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Judge IRWIN.
The declaration contains two counts for damages for injuries, in
substance as follows: "That a certain negro, called Jared; who, by the
laws and customs of Virginia, was held to service and labor in that
State, by the plaintiff; on the first of September, 1845, left the
said service and labor, fled, and escaped into the Western District
of Pennsylvania; that he was pursued by the plaintiff, with the
intent of recapturing him; but that the defendant, well knowing the
premises, and with the intent of preventing the plaintiff from arresting the fugitive, and removing him to Virginia, concealed and
harbored him, thereby enabling the said fugitive to escape from the
labor and service to which he. was lawfully held, by means of which,
his said labor and service became totally and entirely lost to the
Moore, 701; S. C. Cro. Eliz. 633; United States vs. Buford, 8 Peters, 13.
M
2 Usher vs. De Wolfe, 13 Mass. 290.
3 Prosser vs. Edmunds, 1 You. & Col. 481; Mouldsdale vs. Birchall, 2 W. Bl. 820.
' 1 Ala. N. S. 626.
* We shall publish the second part of this article in our next number.
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plaintiff." The jury having given a verdict for the plaintiff, I will
assume the facts just stated to have been fully proved.
The declaration does not conclude against the form of the statute
of the 12th of February, 1793, respecting persons escaping from the
service of their masters; nor does it refer to it in any manner,'and
for this omission a motion is made in arrest of judgment.
Can the action be maintained without this conclusion or reference;
or, in other words, can an action be supported at Common Law for
the injuries complained of?
The'fourth section of the Act of 1793, which imposes a penalty
of five hundred dollars for knowingly rescuing, harboring or concealing a fugitive from labor, coAcludes with this clause: "Saving,
moreover, to the complainant, his right of action for, or on account
of said injuries, or .either of them."
What right of action is meant by this clause? Does it arise
from, and is it limited to the clause itself, so that whatever may' be
the condition of the fugitive-whether he owes service and labor as
a slave, a servant for a term of years, or an apprentice-is it necessary, in case of such injuries as the jury have. foundi to proceed
under the statue, and not at common law? The question can -only
be truly answered by going beyond the statute of 1793; for if there
was no remedy for the injuries contained in the fourth section of
that Act until the time of its passage, there was then, no vitality in
the constitutional provision on the subject of fugitives from labor,
or in so much of the judicial Act of 1789, which confers jurisdiction
inthe Courts of the United States to give relief for injuries "according .to law and usage," until the 12th of February, 1793. Such
a construction, it is conceived, is not warranied by the letter or
spirit of either constitution or law. The clause in the constitution
is in the following words - "No person held to service or labor in
one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another State, shall
in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from
such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on the claim of the
party to whom such service or labor may be due."
A claim in a judicial sense, is a demand of some matter as of
right made by one person upon another, to do, or to forbear to do
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some act or thing, as a matter of duty; and where an act is required, the means are given to make effectual the right, which is
seldom possible by a mere delivery to the owner of the fugitive.
Before the Act of 1793, as well in this as in other instances, this
injustice has been but too frequent. The fugitive might have been
concealed, harbored and assisted to escape into a foreign country,
so that his services might not only haife been partially, but totally
lost to the owner. I cannot believe that such injustice could have
been without remedy.
The claim to a fugitive from labor is a controversy arising under
the constitution, under the express delegation of judicial power given
by that instrument; and the Courts of the United States, under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, have "all the powers necessary for the
exercise of their respective jurisdiction, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law," which principles and usages are those of
the, common law. U. S. vs. Burr,Ap. 2d part, 186. In the case
of Johnson vs. Tkompson, Judge Baldwin, in delivering the opinion
of the Court, says: "This right of the master results from his
ownership, and the right to the custody or ownership of the slave
by he common law, and eleventh section of the Abolition Law of
Pennsylvania, and other laws of that State;" and in the same case
he further says-" The Constitution of the State and Union is not
and the source of those rights. They existed in their plenitude before
any constitutions; which do not create, but protect and secure them
against any violation by the Legislatures or Courts, in making, expounding and administering laws." If this opinion of the Court is
sound-and I do not see how it can be regarded otherwise-it follows, that if there had been no constitutional provision or statute
for the recaption and delivery of fugitives from la;bor, the owner of
an escaped fugitive would have had a remedy by action for damages
in the Court of a State into which he had fled and was harbored,
or in a Court of the United; if either had common law jurisdiction.
And in the case Penn vs. Burr, et. al., Add. Rep. 326, it was
objected by tho defendants' counsel, that a master could not give
authority by advertisement to take his runaway apprentice, "as an
Act for the regulation of apprentices points out a particular pro-
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ceeding in case of absconding apprentices." But the Court decided
"that the Act of Assembly does not change the common law, but
gives further remedy." This last decision is precisely in point, as
it cannot be doubted that the words "fugitives from labor," in the
Act of 1793, extends to apprentices as well as to slaves. From
principle and authority thus far, I am fortified in the opinion that
damages may be recovered for injuries of the nature contained in
the plaintiff's declaration at common law.
In -the case of Jones vs. TVansandt, 2 McLean, 603, however,
which was an action for damages for harboring and concealing a
fugitive from labor, the plaintiff among several counts under the
Act of 1793, inserted one at the common law which became important, from several of the former having been abandoned, and
a finding for the plaintiffs upon two other, including the latter.
On a motion for a new trial which was ordered, Judge McLean
said, that "the defendant is charged with harboring slaves of the
plaintiff who had escaped from his service in Kentucky. But the
wrong charged is no legal wrong, except it is made so by statute,
and the fourth count does not refer to the statute, whichi is a public
one, and the only foundation of the plaintiff's right;" and in another
part of the learned Judge's opinion, he says: "It is clear that the
plaintiff has no common law right of action for the injury complained
of." This decision, from the learning and eminent standing of the
Judge who made it, is entitled to the highest respect; and in a
doubtful case, I should have mistrusted my own judgment in differing from him. The opinion incited deeper reflection, and if possible
deeper conviction, that the conclusion I have arrived at is the law,
and indeed, as if to fortify this conclusion, Judge McLean himself
has said in the same case, that "the statute creates the right and
declares what shall constitute the wrong, and for redress of every
wrong the common law gives a remedy by action for the injury
done." If this is true in a case where the statute creates the right,
it cannot be disputed in a case where the -right existed prior to the
statute, and which, so far from taking away only serves to confirm.
The words "saving moreover to the person claiming such labor and
service, his right of action for or on account of the said injuries, or
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.either of them" must be construed to mean to preserve, to spare, or
to retain a right existing anterior to the statute. Certainly the
words "saving his right," in the absence of negative words, cannot
mean to take away a right; they are the appropriate words, in a
statute which gives a new remedy, but which intends at the same
time to reserve a pre-existing right; by the new remedy a party
may take his election to proceed upon the statute, or at the common
law. The saving clause in the statute is cumulative, and in affirmance of the common law.
Motion in arrest of judgment is therefore overruled, and judgment must be entered upon the verdict.

In the Court of Aypeals, State of New York.
GATES VS. BROWER.
In an action for certain horses sold and delivered, it appeared that the defendant's
wife had bought the goods, and given her own note for them; and that she had
previously, and generally acted as his agent; and that he had made no objection
to the purchase, but had used the horses as his own: held that there was evidence to go to thejury, of the husband's liability, notwithstanding the Married
Women's Acts of New York.

This was an action to recover the value of a span of horses sold
and delivered on the 5th day of October, 1848.
It appeared on the trial that the wife of the defendant bought
the horses of the plaintiff, and gave her note for them, and that she
had previously acted as the agent for her husband. The statement
of the case appears in the opinion of the Court. The Supreme
Court held that the defendant was not liable. The Court of Appeals reviewed the decision, and ordered a new trial.
Graves &. Wood, for Appellant, cited 1 Esp. 142; 4 Wend. 465;
4 Barb. 222; 6 T. R. 176; 8 Mass. 336.
0. Vandenburgh, for Respondent.
MASON, J.-I think there was evidence in this case which should
have been submitted to the jury to determine whether these horses
were not in fact purchased by the wife acting in behalf of the defendant, and whether the purchase was not in fact his. T1ere was
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evidence from which a jury might justly have found such to be
the case. There was evidence that Mrs. Brower acted as the agent
of her husband, and of her authority so to act. She had for years
generally transacted the mercantile business of the family, and had
before given her note, which was .taken up by the defendant. She
seems to have conducted the law business for her husband; to have
had a general supervision of the defendant's farm, and usually
directed in regard to its. management. And she was in the habit
of doing all these things with the defendant's assent, express or
implied. He knew of the purchase of these horses, and made no
objection to it, but on the contrary, I think, ratified the purchase.
The horses were.used as a team on his farm, and he and his boys
used them. All this was certainly very strong evidence to submit
to a jury upon the question of the wife's agency, and of the defendant's ratification thereof, and should have been submitted to the
jury. He is bound by her contracts in such cases from a presumed
absent to the purchase. (2 Kent's Com. 145.) It is upon this
principle that he is bound by such contracts of his wife respecting
those matters about which it has been usual for her to contract,
and him to sanction. (Reeves' Domestic Relations, 79.) This is
upon the same ground that he would be bound if his servant had
contracted for him. The liability proceeds upon the ground .that
he has constituted his wife his agent in the transaction. (Bacon's
Ab. Title.Baron and Feme -N.& J.; Reeve's -Dom. Rel. 79; 2 .
RI. Rep. 176; 3 Bibb; 10 John. 88; 3 Bing. 170; 4 Barb.
222; 7 How. Pr.B. 105.) It was held in the case of .Pitts vs.
Anderson, (3 Bing. 170), that the husband was liable for articles
furnished the wife when she was carrying on business in her name
with his knowledge, though the invoices and receipts were in the
name of the wife, and although she was rated for and paid.the pbor
and paving rates. The same precisely is the case of Lovett vs. Robinson, (7 How. Pr. R. 105), where Judge Wilson held the husband
liable.
The wife-may not only act as the agent of her husband, but any
subsequent acknowledgment or ratification of her acts by the husband is evidence, and equivalent to an original authority. (4 Wend.
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465; 4 Barb. 222; Bac. Ab., Title Baron and Peme, if.) And
it is said he tacitly ratifies and adopts her acts, when, having
received the goods she has purchased, he does not return them.
(1 Campb. 120 Bac. Ab., Title Bdron and Peme, H. Vol. ii. p. 46,
Bonvier's ed.) And'it is said in books of very high authority, that
if there is any evidence to show an assent of the husband, that it
is a question for the jury to determine whether the debt was or was
not contracted under his assent. (Bac. Ab., Title Baron and
Feme, H.) The fact that the plaintiff took the note of the wife on
the sale of these horses does not furnish 'such conclusive evidence
that the purchase was not in fact for the benefit of the husband as
to be incapable of being overcome by the other evidence in the
case. (White vs. Tyler, 6 T. R. 176.)
The acts of .1848 and 1849 in regard to the rights of married
women do not in any manner affect this case. The judgment of
the Court ought to be reversed, and a new trial -granted, for the
refusal of the Court below to allow the case to go to the jury upon
this question. -Ordered accordingly.
In the Suyreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COMMONWEALTH vs JOHNSTON.

1. Special pleading before a Justice of-the Peace, though not to be endouraged, is not
unlawful, and when a defendant has pleaded specially, and the Plaintiff demurs to
his plea, the facts therein alleged are regularly on the record, and become substantive ground of the judgment.
2. In a conviction under the Act of 22d April, 1794, for performing worldly employment on Sunday, it should appear what the work was for which the defendant
was convicted, but as the whole record is to be taken together, it is sufficient if
the description of the work appear in any part of it.
8. Driving an omnibus as a public conveyance daily and every day is worldly employment, and not a work of charity or necessity within the meaning of the Act of
'94, and therefore not lawful on Sunday.
4. A contract of hiring by the month does not, in general, bind the hireling to work
on Sundays, and if his work be such as the Statute forbids, an express agreement
to perform it on.Sunday will not protect hub, for such a contract is void.
5. Though travelling does notin a legal sense fall within the description of worldly
employment intended to be prohibited, yet the running of public conveyances on
Sunday is forbidden by the Statute.
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Certiorari to Alderman McMasters, Pittsburg.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-It has been suggested that it does not sufficiently
appear. from the magistrate's conviction what the worldly employment was, for performing which on Sunday, the defendant was convicted, but a reference to the record will show that the suggestion
is groundless. Complaint was made before Alderman McMasters,
of the city of Pittsburg, that the defendant had performed certain
worldly employment on the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday,
the 4th day of September, A. D. 1853. A summons was issued,
and when the defendant appeared and ascertained the grounds of
complaint, he*did what was very unusual in a Justice's Court, but
which we cannot say was illegal; he put in several special pleas in
the nature of confession and avoidance.-, To the fourth of his pleas,
the Commonwealth demurred, and thus brought the facts therein
alleged upoi the record, and by admitting them made them a substantive ground of the judgment. In this plea it was alleged by
the defendant, that the omnibus and horses which he was driving
on that day, were a "public conveyance for the transportation of
persons travelling upon the streets and roads, in the informution
mentioned, daily, each and every day of the week, including Sunday, and that he, the said defendant, was hired by the proprietors
of the said horses and omnibus at and for a certain price per month,
and at the time mentioned in said information, he was engaged in
fulfilling the contract in that behalf on his part with the proprietors,
of the said omnibus."
He did not allege that he was a traveler, nor that he was employed by travelers, but that he was executing a contract of service with the proprietors of a line of public conveyances. The
Alderman, with these facts alleged and admitted before .him, cbnsidered that such work was worldly employment within the meaning of the Act of Assembly, and proceeded, in the following words,
to convict the said "William Johnston, omnibus driver, of having
done and performed worldly 6mployment or business, not being a
work of necessity or charity, on the Lord's day, commonly called
Sunday, the 4th day of September, A. D. 1853, in driving certain
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horses, to which was attached an omnibus, in which certain persons
were carried over the streets of the city of Pittsburg, and from the
said city over and along certain roads within the county of Allegheny, contrary to the Act of Assembly in such case made and
provided," and accordingly adjudged him to suffer the penalty of
four dollars. This conviction must be taken in connection with the
facts placed on the record by the plea'and demurrer, and so taken,
it is certain, to every ilitent, that the defendant was convicted for
prosecuting on Sunday his occupation as an omnibus driver. The
defendant himself having excluded every other conclusion, and, by
legitimate means, developed the real issue with unwonted exactness, there is no room left for professional cavil, or judicial astutia
on this point. Special pleading, before a Justice of the Peace, is a
novelty which.is by no means to be encouraged, but when a defendant has been permitted -to resort to this mode of getting his facts;
on record, it is too late for him, in a Court of Error, to desert the
facts, or to ask us to shut our eyes upon them.
Strictly stated, then, the question presented for our adjudication
by the record brought up by this certiorari, is, whether omnibus
driving, as an occupation, may be lawfully pursued on Sunday by a
person hired lEy the month for that purpose.
Under the stat. of 29 Oh. II., which forbids only labor in one's
"ordinary calling on Sunday," it is apparent the defendant would
be obnoxious to the penalty, for his work was according to his
"ordinary calling,"-" daily, each and every day of the week, including Sunday," is his own descriptive language. But our Act of
Assembly is more comprehensive in its terms than the English statute, as we took occasion to show at large, recently, in the case of
the Commonwealth vs. Omit. With us not only are men prohibited
from prosecuting their "ordinary callings," on Sunday, but from
"any worldly employment or business whatsoever," except works of
charity and necessity, and such specific kinds of labor as are enumerated in the proviso of the act. It is very manifest, then, that
omnibus driving is a forbidden.business, unless it be a work of
charity, or necessity, or fall within the proviso. That it is not
within the proviso is apparant froIm the works enumerated: the
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dressing of victuals, the landingof passengersby water, the ferrying over the water travelers or persons removing with their families, and the delivery of milk or other necessaries of life. These
are what the Legislature exempted from the operation of the statute, and no man in his senses will contend that driving an omnibus
by the month is either the one or the other of these things. Is
it then a work of charity, or necessity? This is the only remaining
question.
It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to works of charity
and necessity. If the works enumerated in the proviso of the statute be taken as a legislative sample of works of necessity, it might
be said, in general, that supplying the ordinary demands of our
physical natures, and relieving from situations of peril and exposure, are necessary acts, which incur no blame; sand perhaps all
would agree, that visiting and administering to the sick and destitute, and labors for the spiritual welfare of men, are Works both of
charity and necessity. Certain it is, that against such there is no
law, and they may be performed on any day. Still, the exigencies
of human life, which demand works of charity and necessity, are so
numerous, and so diversified by attending circumstances, as to' defy
classification, and to forbid the attempt to prescribe a general rule.
The best we can do is to judge of cases as they arise,' and to treat
them as within the prohibition, or the saving clauses of the statute,
according to the specific features which each presents.
Omnibuses are great conveniences in large towns and populous
districts, and the driving them may, in many circumstances which
it were easy to imagine, be both a necessity and a charity, and as
such perfectly lawful on Sunday; but we are not now dealing with
special cases, or extraordinary occasions, but with an ordinary
everyday employment. The defendant's fourth plea contains no sliggestion of circumstances which might have rendered his act necessary. The justifying fact alleged. is, that he was hired by the
month, and was fulfilling his contract.- But if the work was
unlawful, his contract was void, so far as regarded the Sunday
labor; for it is well settled by the authorities, that if any act is
forbidden under a penalty, a contract to do it is v6id.

.Kepner vs.
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Keefer, 6 W. 233, and the cases there cited. In general, a contract of hiring by the month does not bind the laborer to work on
Sunday; yet, as the statute does not forbid every species of labor,
but expressly licenses such as are mentioned in the proviso, it is
obvious that a persohi hired by the month to perform any of those
labors, may be required to perform them on Sunday. The defendant, however, is not within that category. He was not hired to
execute an employment-that is exempted from the penalties of the
statute, or which, per se, is a work of charity and necessity. Not
a circumstance is'suggested on the record to distinguish his work on
Sunday from what it was on any other day of the week. As it is
not pretended to have been a work of charity or necessity on other
days, it could not have been on Sunday. Running omnibuses is a
mere secular employment, established and maintained for private
gain; ministering, and intended to minister, not to the absolute
wants of our common nature, but to the convenience of the public
for a price. No reason can be assigned in favor of such an employment on Sunday, which might not be urged in behalf of every other
form of productive industry. If, on a day set apart by Divine
command, and human legislation, as a day of rest, proprietors and
drivers of omibuses may prosecute their business, why may not
farmers and mechanics pursue their equally useful, though less
lucrative callings?. These employments, like most other occupations, contribute, more or less directly, to the public convenience,
and are followed on the same motive precisely, which establishes
and maintains omnibuses. If we construe the statute so as to
license the one employment, we must, for consistency's sake, pronounce that it does not forbid the others, and throw open the
tavern, the store, the workshop, and the market-house on Sunday.
If we decide that necessity and charity mean convenience, (and
this is the essence of the demand,) we emasculate the statute, and
sweep away the guards which the Legislature threw around, not
only the morals of society, but the physical health and well being
of both men dnd beasts. If Sunday be thus surrendered to the
fierce rivalry of efforts for promoting the convenience of the public,
it might as well be blotted from the calendar of days. But we
19
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have no right to give up this institution. It has come down to us
with the most solemn sanctions both of God and man, and if we do
not appreciate it as we ought, we are, at the least, bound to preserve it. We have no power to repeal the Act of '94, nor to pnake
its exemption of works of charity and necessity include works of
mere convenience. Our duty requires us to construe the statute so
as to accomplish its purpose, which was to enforce an observance
of Sunday, instead of - obliterating it. We therefore hold, that
drivihg an omnibus as an ordinary public conveyance, is a work
neither of necessity nor charity, within the meaning of the statute,
and, consequqently, that the defendant was properly convicted.
Thus far we have considered the question as it is presented on
the record, apart, entirely, from the evidence taken before the
alderman, and pranted in the defendant's paper book. We might
with propriety regard bur duty, as a Court of review, finished at
this point, for that evidence is no part of the record, and because
there is no bill of exceptions in a Justice's Court, cannot be made
part of it, and on certiorari we look at nothing outside of the record.
Still, however, as the case is one of great publib interest, and both
parties desire ai expression of our opinion in view of the evidence
which is irregularly before us, we will in this instance, without intending a precedent, consider the case upon the facts presented.
A brief, but faithful suimmary of the facts is as follows:
The oinibus which the defendant drove belongs to the Excelsior
line which plies between Pittsburg and Lawrenceville, a distance of
about three miles; they run every half hour from their stand in
Fifth street to -Naser's tavern in Lawrenceville, and on Sundays as
on other days, except that on Sundays one trip less is u~ually made ;it is a well conducted -line, from which the agents generally endeavor
to exclude drunken and disorderly persons, but have nbt always
been successful in doing this even on Sunday; there are several
churches in Lawrenceville, but some of the inhabitants prefer
attending church in Pittsburg, and a portion of these having no
other vehicles, patronize the Sunday omnibus; it is patronized also
by persons visiting the cemetery in the neighborhood of Lawrenceville, and by others who ride f6r recreation an& other purposes;
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-it is spoken of by some witnesses as a great convenience, especially
as a mode for women and children to get to church in Pittsburg;
and several other witnesses describe it as an intolerable nuisance,
and attribute to it the disorderly and licentious crowds who frequent
the taverns and groggeries at Lawrenceville on Sunday. Such is
the case upon the evidence.
Now the argument is, that, though in the abstract, running omnibuses on Sunday may not be a work of necessity within the meaning of the statute, yet, inasmuch as this particular line furnishes
people, otherwise unprovided, with means of attending churches and
the cemetery, at a cheap rate, it becomes a work of necessity, and
is lawful.
It is not our business to discuss the obligations of Sunday any
further than they enter into and are recognized by the law of the
land. The common law adopted it, along with Christianity, of
which it is one of the bulwarks. Lord Coke, commenting on the
maxim of the common law, "Dies -Dominu8 non est juridicus,"
says the Sabbath day is not dies juridieus, for that ought to be consecrated to divine service. "Besides the notorious indecency and
scandal," sayp Blackstone, in his Commentaries, vol.. iv. 63, "of
permitting any secular business to be publicly transacted on that
day, in a country professing Christianity, and the" corruption of
morals which usually follows its profanation, the keeping one day
in seven holy, as a time of relaxation and refreshment, as well as
for public worship, is of admirable service to a State, considered
merely as a civil institution. It humanizes by the help of.conversation and society, the manners of all classes, which would otherwise
degenerate into a sordid ferocity and savage selfishness of spirit.
It enables the industrious workman to pursue his occupation in the
ensuing week with health and cheerfulness; it imprints on the
minds of the people that sense of their duty to God so necessary to
make them good citizens, but which yet would be worn out and
defaced by an unremitted continuance of labor, without any stated
times of recalling them .to the worship of their Maker."
It is apparent from these authorities, as well as from the whole
history of the instituted Sabbath, and particularly from the pre-
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amble to our old Act of 1705 fully quoted in the Commonwealth
vs. Omit, that rest, and the public worship of Almighty God, were
the primary objects of the institutions, both as a divine and civil
appointment; and it seems to me to follow, as a ,necessary consequence, that no means reasonably necessary to these ends can be
regarded as prohibited. Hence, if an invalid, or a person immured
for six days within the close walls of a city, requires a ride into the
country as means of recuperation, which is the true idea of rest,
there- is nothing in the Act of '94 to forbid the employment of a
driver, horses and carriage on Sunday to accomplish it. Equally
lawful is the .employment of the same means to go to the church of
one's choice, or to visit the grave of the loved and the lost, to pay
the tribute of a tear. In a very high sense, and perfectly compatibl'e with the statute, these are works of necessity and charity, and
had this defendant shown that he was employed for these, purpQses,
apnd that he was merely engaged in accomplishing them, he ought
not to have been convicted. But such was not the case. He was
not engaged in executing a special undertaking for either of these
innocent purposes, but in performing a contract,"by the month, for
the driving a public conveyance. The labor for which he contracted
was to be exactly the same on Sundays as on other days of the week.
Some would no doubt avail themselves of the omnibus to ride for
health and strength, to. visit the pemetery, and to go to church, not
only on Sunday, but on other days of the week; but he was, notwithstanding, a common carrier,pursuing his ordinary occupation,
which was a worldly employment -as truly as merchandize is. The
motives of an occasional customer do not determine the character of
a man's business. Its character is acquired from its general aspects,.
and from the intentioii of the person prosecutingit, rather than from
those of the person patronizing it. The argument amounts to this
-omnibus driving may be pursued on Sunday exactly as on other
days of the week, if anybody rides to church or the cemetery in it;
though worldly employment in all its aspects, and actually contributing to idleness, dissipation and disorder, yet it is so sanctified
by this casual patronage, as to become a work of charity and necessity within the high significance of those words as used in the Act
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of '94. A specious pretext, to make the most of it, to cover up a
palpable violation of that law.
Had the persons riding to chui'ch -or the cemetery been prosecuted, they might have alleged a proper and necessary work, or had
the defendant been engaged specifically in carrying them, and running his omnibus for no other purpose, he would have been blameless; but, according to his own showing, he was fulfilling a contract
of another kind, and with other parties. The attempt to give his
business a different aspect from that which it has worn from the
beginning, is abortive. Something has been said about the indelicacy of prying into the motives of passengers travelling in a public
conveyance, to which I fully subscribe; but it is apparent that it is
the defence which is guilty of this indelicacy. The Commonwealth
complains against a line of omnibusses for running on Sundays as
on other days--the defendant makes inquisition of the motives with
which his passengers ride, with a view of finding some ground to
justify his apparent violation of the law; and this, I agree, is an
example which ought not to be encouraged in the conductors of a
public conveyance.
But, it is said, judicial construction has established that travelling
on Sunday is not a violation of the Act, and then it is argued, with
an appearance of logical precision, that if the end be legitimate, and
not forbidden by law, all the means which are appropriate, which are
adapted to that end, may lawfully be employed to carry it into effect.
This conclusion will be found, I think, to be too broadly stated. The
act of 1786 was essentially the same as the act of 1794, but the proviso of that act exempted, among other things, "stage-coaches, or
stage-wagons carrying travelers, having the consent of a Justice
of the Peace on extraordinary occasions." The legislature of '86
seem to have intended not ohly to license travelling on Sunday
with one's own private means, but by public conveyances also, with
the approbation of a justice, for, at that day, "stage-coaches and
wagons" were the only public conveyances by land. But when the
act of '94 was'passed to supply -that of '86, this license of public
conveyances was stricken out, and the words "or ferrymen from
carrying over the water travelers, or persons removing with their
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families," were inserted in lieu of them. Now as travelers- who
required the help of ferrymen were, like persons removing with their
families, generally, perhaps at that day always, travelers by private
conveyance, the true construction I apprehend of the act of 1794 is,
that whilst travelling by private conveyance is not forbidden; the
running of public conveyances is. The act forbids "all worldly
employment or business whatever, not works of charity and nQcessity," except such as are enumerated in the proviso. But public
conveyances -are not only not enumerated there, but being in the
proviso of the act of '86, from which that of '94 was copied, was
intentionally omitted in the latter. It would therefore be against
all rules of construction to read the two provisos alike, and the point
inwhich the Legislature has made them te differ, is decisive against
public conveyances. The legislation which has been required to
authorize Railroad Companies to run their cars on Sunday, indicates that this is the true construction of the act of '94, and the
dictum of Ch. J. Gibson in Jones vs. Huges, 5 S. & R. 802, is
express to the same point. The prosecution in that case was for
travelling on horseback, and after the defendant.was discharged he
brought an action of false imprisonment against the magistrat6 who
issued the warrant of arrest; but this Court refused to sustain the
action, the Oh. J. observing that." by the act of 22d April, 1794,
Justices of the Peace may punish in a summary manner for performing any worldly employment or business on the Lord's -day; and
although travelling does not, in a legal sense, fall within the description of worldly employment or business, it is a subject on which a
magistrate might readily be mistaken, for a carrier driving his
team along the highway, which bears a striking resemblance to
travelling, would be in the exercise of his vocation, and if on Sunday, obnoxious to the penalty of the law." Here the diatinctioh is
marked, which I suppose the Legislature intended-travelling, ipso
facto, is not forbidden, but public conveyances are, so that the conclusion that a lawful end includes all -appropriate means, however sound in some cases, is tod broad for this occasion. The
doctrine in -Logan vs. Matthews, 6 Barr. 417, is coincident with
this distinction.. The conveyance hired there was for a special pur-
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.pose, and that a filial duty, and became the bailee's private conveyance pro hac vice. Nor has any case been cited which conflicts
with the distinction; and seeing that it is created by statute, it is
worthy to be maintained, even if supported by no good reason.
But there is a reason. Public conveyances that run regularly on
Sunday, whether there are passengers or not, are much more likely
to interrupt the exercises of religious meetings, and disturb the
peace of neighborhoods, than private conveyances are; and, besides, they are pursuing a vocation, which, like all other secular
callings, it is the policy of the law to suspend on that day. A
traveler, on the other hand, is away from his vocation. If travelling were a man's ordinary employment, it might well be doubted
whether he would be within the protection of the statute, for the
clause of exemption mentions travelers, sojourners, strangers,and
persons removing with theirfamilies; titles all these, which indi-

cate absence from vocation, as well as home.
It is not necessary to decide whether the persons riding in the
defendant's omnibus between Pittsburg and Lawrenceville could be
considered travelers within the meaning of the act, for they are not
before us; and what is decisive against the defendant is, the confessed fact tliat he was driving, as his ordinary employment or
vocation, a public conveyance. Granting that they were lawful
travelers, he was engaged in furnishing them contraband means of
conveyance.
We have now considered the reasons which, drawn from the evidence in the case, have been urged against the conviction. We
might have disposed of them in a word, on the ground that they
could not arise on the record, but from respect to the parties and
interests involved, we have preferred to discuss them, and to show,
as I trust has been done, that- the Alderman was in the direct line
of the statute, when, in view of the evidence before him, he decided

that the defendant's work was worldly employment or business, and
not a work of charity or necessity. Doubtless some partial inconvenience will be experienced from stopping these omnibuses on
Sunday, and if this prove too high a.price for the good results that
may accrue, the remedy must be sought, not in the Courts, but in
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the Legislature. Whilst, however, this act of Assembly remains
unaltered by the Legislature, it is not to be frittered away by judicial constructions. Our fathers, who planted in our fundamental
law the assertion of those immortal truths, that all men haye a
natural and, indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according

to the dictates of their own consciences, that no man can be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of public worship; and

-

that no human authority can in any case whatever control or interfere -ith the rights of conscience; enacted, also, the statutes of
1705, 1786 and 1794 for the suppression of worldly employments
on SunIay. . So far from conflicting with those invaluable rights of
conscience, they' regarded such statutes as indispensable to secure
them. It would be a small boon to the people of Pennsylvania to
declare their indeteasible right to woiship God according to the
dictates of"their consciences, amid the din and confusion of secular
e.mployments, and with desecrations on every hand of what they
conscientiously believe to be hallowed time. These statutes were
not designed to compel men to go to church, or to worship God in
any manner inconsistent with personal preferencbs; but to compel
a cessation of those employments -which. are calculated to interfere
with the rights of those who choose to assemble for public worship.
The day was set apart for a purpose, and the penal enactihents
guard it, but they leave every man free to ue it for-that purpose
or not. If he wish to use it for the purpose designed, the law protects him from the annoyance of others-if he do not, it restrains
him from annoying those who do so use it. Thus the law, without
oypressing anybody, becomes auxiliary to the rights of conscience.
And there are other rights, intimately associated with the rights ofconscience, which are'worth preserving. The right to rear a famiily
with a becoming regard to the institutions of Christianity; and without compelling them to witness hourly infractions of one of its fundamental laws-the right to enjoy the peace and good order of
society and the increased securities of life and property which
result from a decent observance of Sunday--the right of the poor
to rest from labor, without diminution of wages, ox loss of employment-the right of beasts of burthen to repose on6-seventh of their
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time from their unrequited toil-these are real and substantial
interests which the legislature sought to secure by this. enactment;
and when has legislation aimed at higher objects? If we doubted
the policy of the statute, it would nevertheless be our sworn duty to
administer it faithfully; but with a profound conviction of its wisdom and value, we are resolutely opposed to a course of judicial
construction. that would. cheapen its demands and impair its power
for good.
The judgment is affirmed.

In the .istriet Court of Philadeph1ia.
LEVY ET AL.

'VS.

THE MERCANTILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

In an action on a policy of insurance, it appeared that the goods insured contained
in 36 bales and cases, had arrived at their port of destination, and had been subsequently destroyed by fire in the warehouse of the consignee, before inspection,
'with the exception of two cases. The goods contained in one of the latter, of a
delicate fabric, were injured apparently by salt water, and there was slight evidence that it exhibited on the outside stains of salt-water; which stains were
proved also to have been on some of the other packages before the fire; the
remaining case was also damaged. The vessel, however, was sound and seaworihy at the end of the voyage; the rest of the cargo uninjured; there was no
violent storm during, the voyage. The goods also were of various descriptions,
and differently packed. Held that there was no evidence to go to the jury, of a
loss by the perils of the sea, at least as to thirty-four packages.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Court, by
STROUD, J.-The plaintiffs brought an action of covenant on a
policy of insurance, dated January 15, 1851, on 24 bales and 12
cases of goods, shipped from this city to San Francisco, State of
California. The agreed value of the shipment was $24,657 80.
The goods were designated by the plaintiff's clerks as very high
priced dress goods, consisting of silks, satins, gloves, ribbons, &c.
The vessel arrived at San Francisco June 5, 1851, without encountering any violent storm. She was. in so good a condition as to
require no repairs whatever. The cargo was apparently unifijured.
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On the 18th or 19th of the same month the plaintiffs' shipment
was unloaded, and with the exception of a single package marked
115, was taken to the warehouse of Mawson & Brothers, to whom
it had been consigned. One package, a case, No. 135, had been
sold to arrive, and this was opened soonmafter it reached the *arehouse. It contained gloves and silks. These were found to be
damaged, especially the gloves, which had become'spotted. The
extent of the damage was differently estimated by the plaintiff's
witnesses, varying from 35 to 70 per cent. on the entire contents.
None of the other packages were opened, but remained in the
warehouse in the condition in which they were when brought from
the vessel. A few days afterwards, two or three at most, the warehouse took fire, and with all it contained was burnt up. The destruction of the plaintiffs' goods, there deposited, was entire; not
a vestige remained. The package No. 115, (whether a bale or a
case did not"appear) had been, unintentionally as to the consignees,
carried to a different warehouse, and was discovered after the fire,
probably in the same condition in which it was when brought from
the vessel. It contained goods mentioned in. general terms as
inferior to those of No. 135, and which in the same general way
were spoken of as sliglhly damaged. But in what respect they
were injured there was no evidence. The plaintiffs' clerks proved
that all the goods had been packed by experienced hands, and withi
the utmost care "and skill. Some were enclosed first by gutta
percha and then by heavy canvas. Others were covered by oil
cloth instead of gutta percha.

They were stowed in the vessel in the most judicious manner.
The vessel was well dunnaged; boiler iron laid in the manner of
shingles upon a roof were placed at the bottom of the vessel as high
as the kelson. When unloaded no water was in the hold, and'no
mark or stain or trace of salt water was discernible there; nor was
any rust or corrosion upon the boiler iron.
It was in evidence that gloves and silks were both susceptible of
injury by dampness alone, without the actual contact of water.
Gloves in particular are often spotted from mere atmospheric dampness, especially in places bordering on the sea. Injury from the
latter cause is excepted from the policy.
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A few articles, not a part of the plaintiff's shipment, were damaged by drippings from a parcel of codfish, which had been stored
above them. The rest of the cargo belonging to other owners than
the plaintiffs, arrived in the best condition.
The plaintiffs claimied for damage to the whole shipment, to the
extent found in respect to the package No. 1M5, which had been
opened. The verdict was for $10,218 27.
The only evidence up6n which they asserted their right to damages, on the score of injury to the goods, was as to the thirty-four
packages which had not been opened, but were wholly consumed by
the fire, derived from witnesses through the medium of depositions.
One of these had been examined here as a going witness. The
others under a commission to San Francisco. The evidence had
relation to the. external appearance of the packages, when lying in
the warehouse of Mawson & Brother's.
They spoke of stains and marks on the packages. But their
statements were not precise, nor distinct, nor positive.
Thus one of the consignees, whose deposition was taken in this
city, after stating that the case 135 was damaged so as to be almost
a total loss-that it was damaged 60 to 70 per cent.-said the
other cases ap'pearea, from what I could see, to be moie damaged
than -this case. A second witness, speaking of No. 135, says,
"the exterior of this case was marked, discolored, and had all the
* appearance of damage by salt water," and then adds, "I noticed
the other cases-I examined them exteriorly, particularly, as many
of them as I could see.

They were packed one upon another.

The store was very cramped; some of the cases had a better, and
some a worse appearance exteriorly, than the case that was opened.
They were stained and discolored from salt water-all were so."
This was said upon the examination in chief. His cross examination reads, "a portion of the goods I could not see, as the store
was so full. I did not examine all the boxes because I was waiting
for the agent of the underwriters to come, and I knew I would
THEX see THEM ALL."

And a third witness, "'I saw one case opened; it contained gloves,
they were badly damaged. The other boxes were stained as if
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The cross examination of this witness
injured by salt water."
shows with what degree of information he spoke. "I had a cursory look at all the boxes; I did not examine them separately, I
saw the greatest part, of the stains and marks on the boxes at the
GLANCE I gave them."
The fourth and last witness on the subject of the damage to the
shipment, "saw one opened, I have no doubt the marks upon it
were from salt water." .
Now, throwing aside all the evidence adduced by the defendant-evidence as to the stanch condition of the vessel, throughout the
voyage and on the arrival at San Francisco, the judicious stowage,
the condition of. the rest of the cargo, the quiet passage, the absence of all trace of salt water within the vessel, &c.; and giving
to the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses, who saw the goods at
San Franc sco, its utmost force, was there proper, ground for the
verdict of the jury? And ought it tohave been left to them to
infer from this evidence that the goods contained in the packages
which, without having been opened, had been consumed by the fire,
were damaged by the perils of the sea, or damaged at dll .
It may be well doubted on the authority of F.eming vs. 17i6 Marine Insurance Co. (3 W. & S. .144 and 153), whether there was
any evidence to submit to the jury of damage by a'peril of the
sea, even in respect to the package which was opened. The only
allegation as to the cause of the damage was that it was done by
sea-water. Yet admitting this to have been the cause, if the water
penetrated the vessel, by reason of "defective caulking, imperfect
closing of the hatches, or neglect of pumping," the insurer of the
cargo is not responsible for this, but it must be borne by the master
and owners of the vessel.
The vessel, at the end -of her voyage, was perfectly sound 4nd
sea-worthy, neither receiving nor requiring any repairs.
The rest of the cargo, with the slight exception which has been
pointed out and accounted for, had'suffered no injury.
There was express evidence that no violent storm or unusual excitement of the waves, from any cause, had occurred during the
voyage, and the~re was no reliable evidence to the: contrary. The
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condition ot the vessel itself was an overwhelming confutation of
any supposition inconsistent with the general tenor of the defendant's evidence; that the vessel was subjected to no peril during any
part of the voyage. But passing over this part of the case, and
conceding that a verdict for damage to the package No. 135, which
was opened, was justified by the evidence, was there any evidence
to submit to the jury in respect to damage to the packages which
were destroyed by the fire without examination of their contents.
The strength of the plaintiffs' claim as to the-unopened packages,
consists in a species of argument from analogy.
The package
which was opened disclosed an injury to the delicate fabrics which
it contained, believed to have been produced-by contact with salt
water, and there was some reason, very slight indeed, to believe
that externally it exhibited marks or stains of salt water. Whilst
the witnesses who saw thid package, declare that they saw similar
marks or stains on the other packages. This is to state the evidence in its fullest force.
Does this afford-ground to infer that the goods within each package were similarly injured? If the packages were precisely alike
in bulk and form, comprised similar goods, and these had been
packed with equal care, and it was shown that each exhibited similar efternal marks or stains, there might be room to infer a similar
injury to all. But the evidence proves no such state of resemblances.
The goods were not of the same kind in all the packages.
The packages themselves were of two descriptions-baZes and
cases. They were not packed alike; some were enclosed in gutta
percha and some in oil-cloth. And although both of these substances afford great protection against water, the one is much more
liable to fracture than the other. There may be some important'
differences between a bale and a case.
There is no evidence on the subject, nor is there any evidence
in respect to the opened package, which appears. to have been a
case, whether the goods were surrounded by gutta percJa or oilcloti, nor whether the substance, whichever it was, was in a sound
or injured condition.
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Suggestions like these, which might be multiplied still more, seem
to require us to say, that there was no evidence on the trial, to be
submitted to the jury in regard to at least thirty-four of the thirtysix packages of which the shipment was composed. As to No..115,
which was found after the fire; it is to be remarked that whilst
nothing was easier than to ascertain its exact condition externally
and internally, we have very little information of any kind about it.
It is not said what it cofntained, how it was packed, in what manner
the.goods were injured, nor whether or not it -was externally stained.
As a new trial is to be granted, it is -incumbent on us to notice
an objection. which was made to the admission of a matter in
evidence.
The defendant put in evidence, depositions of numerous persons
employed on boar the vessel throughout the voyage. Amohg these
were the captain and first mate; their testimony concurred in representing the voyage as eminently free from peril of every kind. To
contradict them, but especially to affect the testimony of the first
mate, the plaintiffs offered the log-book. It was shown to have been
kept by the mate, and to have been subject to the inspection of the
captain, and in fact that he had been seen once or twice engaged
apparently in reading it..
For the purpose for which it was offered we think it was rightly
admitted. What reliance was to be placed upon it, was for the
judgment of the jury. Its legitimate effect was limited to the purpose for which it was offered and received. It ought not to have
had the slightest influence on the clear, consistent and positive evidence of the other witnesses, who had been examined on the same
subject. Rule absolute.
H. H. Phillips,for plaintiffs.
John C. Bullitt, for defendants.
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In the Court of Chancery, Georgia.
THE UNION BRANCH RAILROAD COMPANY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, VS. THE
EAST TENNESSEE AND GEORGIA. RAILROAD COIPANY, DEFENDANTS.
1. A plea which sets forth the character and terms of an act of the legislature,
granting a franchise, and material to the defendant's case, which act is alluded
to in the bill only as "a pretended legislative grant," performs the proper office
of a plea, by bringing forward matter not distinctly appearing in the bill, and
which displaces the equity.
2. Advantage cannot be taken of non-user or misuser of an act of incorporation in
any collateral action.
3. Upon trial of the question as to the right of way in the East Tennessee and
Georgia Railroad Company over the route upon which they have constructed their
road in Georgia, as against the claim of the Union Branch Railroad to the same;
Held, that the former company takes no legal aid from the resolutions of our
legislature, passed in the year 1837, offering to secure similar privileges to those
enjoyed by the Western and Atlantic Railroad in our State, to any road in the
State of Tennessee seeking to connect therewith; provided, that the latter State
would grant the privilege of extending that road to the Tennessee River.
4. In the year 1840, the Legislature of Georgia incorporated the Cross Plains and
Red Clay Railroad, reserving the right to repeal the act of incorporation. In
1847, an Act was passed granting the right of way over the same route to others.
In 1849, the legislature by act recognized the privileges granted to said company
by the Act of "1840, changed the name to Union Branch Railroad, and repealed
the plause in the Act of 1840, reserving the right to repeal that Act; Hfdd, that
the Act of 1849 could not affect the rights which had been acquired under the
Act of 1847, becaus that Act repealed the Act of 1840, so far as the right of
way was concerned.
5. The Act of 1847, to which reference is made, repeals the Act of 1840, because
the legislature reserved the right to repeal that Act, and because the Act of 1847
is directly repugnant to the Act of 1840, as to this grant of the right of way.
6. The Act of 1840 provides, that in the event of its repeal, the appointment of
persons who shall "fix the value" of the work, investments and improvements of
the company may be made either by the repealing Act or by the Governor, and
the stockholders.
7. An act of incorporation, in which the legislature have reserved the right of
repeal, may be repealed by implication, upon the principle that every'affirmative
statute is a repeal by implication of a precedent affirmative statute, so far as it
is contrary thereto.
8. The prohibition in the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the
United States to the effect that no State without the consent of Congress, "sshall
enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power,"
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is political in its character, and has no reference to a mere matter of contract, or
to the grant of a franchise which in nowise conflicts with the powers delegated
to the General Government by the States.
9. A corporation can have no legal existence out of the sovereignty by which it is
created; but its existence, as a person capable of contracting may be recognized
in another State, and as -uch, it may be there contracted with.

In Equity, from Murray Superior fourt -Decided by Judge
JoN H. LuMPKiN, April Term, 1853.

The following is the Bill of Exceptions, which sets forth the facts
in this case. The assignment of error as to the decision of the
court in sustaining the plea and dismissing the bill only was relied
on before this court.

Georgia, Whitfield County:
Be it remembered that on the fifteenth day of ,April, in the year
of bur Lord 1853, during the regular term of the Superior Court
of said county, his honor, John H. LTufiikin, one of the judges of
the Superior Court of said State, presiding-the cause of the Union
Branch Railroad, complainant vs. the East Tennessee ind Georgia
Railroad Company, Thomas H. Calloway, William Grant, Simeon
D. Reynolds, and Jonathan N. "Cate, defendants, then and there
pending on the equity side of said court, .being a bill for discovery,
relief and injunction, came on to be heard; on a motion for an injunction,- the appointment of a receiver, and a plea in. bar to the
complainant's bill of complaint; in which bill of complaint -it is
amongst other things alleged that the Legislature of Georgia, at
its session in the year of our Lord 1840, incorporated the. complainant by the name and style of the Cross Plains and Red Clay.
Branch Railroad Company of Georgia, for the purpose of completing fifteen miles of Railroad withih the limits of Georgia , dommencing at a .place then known by'the name of and called Cross
Plains, but now knbwn as the town or the city of Dalton, and
extending thence to and terminating on" the line of the State of
Tennessee,' at a place called Red Clay. The said bill of complaint
further alleged the rights of the said complainant under the charter, that it was a contract irrevocable and unalterable, save at the
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option of both parties, except so far as the power of modification
or revocation was reserved in the act of incorporation, and that in
the act of incorporation it was enacted and stipulated that no other
Railroad should thereafter be built within twenty miles of the route,
the complainant might select, complainant was allowed ten years to
complete the said road from the time of its incorporation, and it
was required to commence active operations on said road in good
faith in twelve months, and if it did not, its charter was to be forfeited to all intents and purposes; which it avers it had done, and
which it found necessary, for reasons"which are stated in the record
(to which plaintiff in error begs leave to refer if necessary as a
part of this bill of exceptions) temporarily to suspbnd its operations;
that the General Assembly of Georgia, by an act approved the 5th
day of December, 1849, changed the name of complainant, and
while the said last act continued, all the privileges and liabilities df
the said complainant under the original charter, it allowed it three
years from the passage of the last named act to complete the said
road, and repealed the 10th section of the original act of incorporation which reserved the right to any (then) future. legislature to
repeal said act of incorporation, and declared forfeiture of the charter if complainant should sell its charter to any other company, or
if it should not commence, in good faith, active operations on said
road within twelve, months after the passage of said act. The said
bill proceeds to set forth its operations since the passing of the last
named act, and, amongst other things, alleges that complainant
would have completed said road within the time given it, had it not
been prevented by the usurpation of the Railroad route it had
selected, and the appropriation thereof to its own use by the East
Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Company. The bill alleg6s that
the last named company was .first incorporated by the Legislature
of Tennessee, in 1835, for the purpose of building a Railroad from
Knoxville, in East Tennesse, to a point on the Southern boundary
of Tennessee, that said Company was to commence the said Railroad, or contract for the construction of some part of it, on or
before the first day of January, in the year eighteen hundred and
thirty-eight, and complete the same on or before the first -day of
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January, eighteen hundred and forty-four; and on failure to do so,
the interest of said Company in said Railroad was to be forfeited
and cease. The said bill alleges further, amongst other things,
that the time for completing said road was extended by the Legislature of Tehnessee, from time- to time, until it was finally fix~d at
the year 1860; that in 1849 the Legislature of Tennessee changed
the name of the complainant from its original name, "The Hiwassee Railroad Company," to the name of "The East Tennessee
and Georgia Railroad Company;" giving -it all the powers and
privileges it possessed under its former name; that the said East
Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Company, afterwards, under a
pretended legislative grant from the State of Georgia, entered upon
and seized the 'said Railroad route selected by complainant; and
appropriated the same to its own use, without the consent.of com.plainant, contrary to law, and in defiance of the superior claim and
vested rights of complainant, and maintained forcible possession
against complainant. . The bill further alleges the giving of notice
by the complainant to'the defendants, xiot to proceed with their work
on said road, that complainant claimed it as its .own property. It
further alleges that complainant proposed to pay the defendants for
all outlays on said road, and pay .all losses, &c., if it would deliver
over the same to complainant, which the defendants refused to do;
that at an early day in the progress of said work by the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Company, the complainant.undertook
and commenced the construction -of said road on its own selected
and surveyed route, and was forcibly prevented from doing so by
the defendants' agents, servants, and hirelings, for the reasons
specified in said. bill of complaint, and the IEast Tennessee and
Georgia Railroad Company seized and appropriated to the use of
said company the said Railroad route without compensation hnd
against the will of complainant, its lands and right of way'.. The
complainant insists, in its said bill of complaint, in substance, that
inasmuch as the defendants constructed said road, made improvements and erected fixtures thereon, with a full notice of complainant's right, the title thereto was vested in complainant.
To the allegations of said bill, the defendants pleaded in bar the
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*act of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, passed in
1836, incorporating the Riwassee Railroad Company, setting
forth in said plea, a portion of the powers and privileges conferred
on the said Hiwass.ee Railroad Company by said act of incorporation. The said defendants further pleaded the act of the General
*Assembly of the State of Tennessee, passed on the 24th day of January, 1838, entitled an act to authorize the State of Georgia to extend
her Western and Atlantic Railroad, from the Georgia line to some
point on the Eastern Margin of the Tennessee River; by which act,
it was amongst other things enacted, that the State of Georgia shall
be allowed to make every necessary reconnoissance and survey, for
the purpose of ascertaining the most eligible route for the extension
of her Western and Atlantic Railroad from the Georgia line to the
Eastern Margin of the Tennessee River, and further enacted that
as soon as said route and point shall be ascertained, the State of
Georgia shall be allowed the right of way for the extension and construction of her said Railroad from the Georgia line to the Tennessee
River, and that she shall be entitled to all privileges, rights and
immunities (except the subscription on the part of Tennessee), and
be subject to the same restrictions, as far as they are applicable, as
are granted, made and prescribed for the benefit, government and
direction of the Hiwassee Railroad Company; and it was further
enacted, that the foregoing rights and privileges are conferred on
the State of Georgia on condition that, whenever application is
made, she will grant and concede similar ones, and to as great
extent, to the State of Tennessee, or her incorporated companies;
and the said defendants further pleaded the act of the General
Assembly of the State of Georgia passed the 28d day of December,
in the year 1847, to authorize the Hiwassee Railroad Company
of the State of Tennessee to extend their Railroad from the Tennessee line to.some point on the Western and Atlantic Railroad of
the State of Georgia, by which it was, amongst other things,
enacted that the Hiwassee Railroad Company of the State of
Tennessee shall be allowed the privilege of making every necessary
reconnoissance and survey for the purpose of ascertaining the most
eligible route for the extension of the Highwassee Railroad from
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the Tennessee line to some point on the Western and Atlantic Railroad above Dalton.
And it was by the same statute further enacted, that as soon as
said route shall be ascertained, the said Hiwasgee Railroad Company shall be allowed the right of way over said route, to said
point on the Western and Atlantic Rail Road, and shall be entitled
to all the rights, privileges and immunities, and be subject to the
same restrictions, as granted to the Western and Atlantic Railroad
of the State of Georgia, in the State of Tennessee, by an act of the
State of Tennessee, passed on the 24th of January, 1838, entitled
An Act to authorize the State of Georgia to extend her Western
and Atlantic Railroad from the Georgia line to some point on the
Eastern Margin of the Tennessee River.' The defendants further
pleaded in substande, that the Legislature of the State of Tennessee
passed, on the 4th of February, 1848, an act changing the name of
the Hiwassee Railroad Company to that of the East Tennessee
and Georgia Railroad Company, and conferred on it, under its new
name, all the powers, privileges, &c., it had and possessed under its
old name, and authorized and empowered it; with. the consdut and
authority of the Legislature of Georgia,. to penetrate the State of
Georgia with their road, so as to'connect the same. The defendants deny in their said plea, that they or persons employed by
them have -done any manner of thing or act that they. were or are
not authorized to do by the aforesaid several statutes above pleaded
and recited in or about the survey, locations, constructions or use
of said Road, and insist that all they have done they have a right
to do under and by virtue of the said acts. and. statutes; and they
further deny that the complainant has a right to hold lands or real.
estate. .And on the hearing of said cause, in manner aforesaid, and
upon the points aforesaid, the said Court decided, ordered and
adjudged, that upon the hearing of argument on the bill and plea,
ana motion for an injunction and the appointment of Receiver, it
was Qrdered by the Court that the motion for an injunction and the
appointment of Receiver be refused, that the plea be sustained and
the bill be dismissed; to which decision of the Court the counsel for
the complainant excepted. And the counsel for the complainant,
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.on this 8th day of May, in the year aforesaid, being within thirty
days from the adjournment of the said term of said Court, tenders
his bill of exceptions, and says:
1st. That the Court erred in refusing to grant said injunction.
2d. That the Court erred in refusing to appoint a Receiver in
said cause.
3d. That the Court erred in sustaining said plea, as a plea in bar
of the complainant's rights of recovery.
4th. That the Court erred in dismissing the said bill of com-

plaint.
And inasmuch as the facts aforesaid do not appear of record, the
complainant, by its counsel, prays that this his bill of exceptions
may be signed and certified as required by the statute in said case
made and provided.
STARNES,

J., delivering the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is alone upon the sufficiency of the plea.
The other assignments of error were abandoned in the argument
before us.
1. It is insisted, first, that this plea is not good, as it brings forward no new matter; and that advantage might have been taken of
what is set forth in it, upon demurrer.
It is true, that the proper office of a plea in chancery is to bring
forward some fact not distinctly appearing in the bill, which displaces the equity.
Trying this plea by this rule of chancery practice, we sustain it,
for we find it bringing forward the fact of the grant of franchise to
the Hiwassee Railroad Company, by the Legislature of Georgia,
in the year 1847, which fact is alluded to in the bill only as "a pretended Legislative grant from the State of Georgia.". Neither the
character of that grant nor its terms are stated in the bill, and the
plea, therefore, in clearly and distinctly setting forth these things,
brings forward new matter within the reason of the rule stated.
2. Another 'objection.to the plea is, that it contains no denial of
the allegation in the bill to the effect that the said Railroad Company suspended its work with the intention of abandoning it'at one
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period after its charter; that this, consequently, must be taken as
true, and that charter be regarded as having been forfeited.
This objection cannot prevail1. Because in the same connection the bill alleges that a few
days before the charter was to become void by reason of thii suspension, the Legislature of Tennessee extended the time for the
construction of the Road. 2. Because advantagecannot be taken
of non-user or mis-user of an act of incorporation in this collateral
way,- according to the view which this Court entertains on this subject. Young vs. ffarrion, 6 Geo. R. 180.-"
Finding the defendants thus rightly in Court with the plea, let
us inquire into the question which it raises.
The complainant insists upon its right of way over the premises
in question, by virtue of the act of our General Assembly., passed
in the year 1840, granting corporate privileges to the Cross Plains
and Red Clay Railroad, together with the Act of 1849, changing
the title of this company to its present name, recognizing its original
privileges, repealing the 9th and 10th sections of the Act of 1840,
which gave to the Legislature the right to repeal the charter on
terms, and allowing three years in which to complete the -road.
Acts of 1840, Pamp. 87; of 1849, Pamp. 241.
The defendants in their plea rely on the Act of 184-7, granting to
the Hiwassee Railroad Company the right of way over the premises,
together .with ceftain resolutions of the General Assembly of 1887,
offering to secure similar privileges to those enjoyed by the Western
and Atlantic Railroad in our State, to any road in the State of
Tennessee, seeking, to connect- with the same, Provided that the
latter State would grant the privilege of extendling that road to the.
Tennessee river.
8. It is the opinion of- this Court, that the defendants. take' no
legal aid from the resolutions of 1837. We are not prepared to
hold, that after the Legislature passed these resolutions, the. State
was forever prohibited from granting to its own citizens the exclusive
right of way over the territory which lay between the Western and
Atlantic Railroad and the Tennessee line, and that the sole right of
constructing and working Railroads in this portion of our State,
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was thereafter reserved to citizens of Tennessee, seeking to connect
with our road. This we must hold, if we give to these resolutions
of 1837, the effect claimed for them.
4. Neither do we agree with the complainant that the Act of
1849, cited, has any influence in the consideration of this subject,
or in any manner affects the right of the defendants ; because, we
believe that the Act of 1847, repealed the Act of 1840, so far as
the grant of the 6xclusive right of way to the complainant was concerned, and a consideration -ofthese two latter Acts must determine
the matters in issue between the parties.
5. We hold that the Act of 1847, repeals the Act of 1840, for
the following reasons:
1. In section 10 of the Act of 1840, incorporating the Cross
Plains and Red Clay Railroad, (now the complainant,) the Legislature reserved to itself the right to repeal that Act of incorporation
on certain terms, viz: that the Stockholders should be paid for their
work, investments and improvements, if it were repealed.
2. ThattheAct of 1847, in granting to the Riwassee Railroad Company the right of way over the same premises, was directly repugnant to the Act of 1840 ; and, as a consequence, by well-known and
settled rules, repealed the Act of 1840, or so much of it as secured
to complainant the exclusive right of way over these premises. By
virtue of the Act of 1840, the complainant, perhaps, may still construct a road "1frqm the city of Dalton, and extending thence, and
terminating on the line of the State of Tennessee, at a place called
Red Clay ;" for the Act of 1847 secures to the Riwassee Railroad
Company the right of way only over the roiite of said Company,
"1with such rights, privileges and immunities" as are granted to the
Western and Atlantic Railroad in the State of Tennessee, by an
Act of said State, passed on the 24th day of January 1838. Acts
1847, Pamp. 171.
This grant of privileges, &c., by the Act of Tennessee, passed on
the 24th of January, 1838, is that which by said State had been
previously " ganfed, made and prescribed for the benefit, government and direction of the Hiwassee Railroad Company." Acts of
Tenn. 1838.
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On looking to the charter of this Company and to the legislation
of Tennessee concerning it, we find no grant to that Company of
any exclusive right of way, except for a space of two hundred feet
through which their track shall pass, 11from Knoxville, East Tennessee, through the Hiwassee District, to a point on the southern
boundary of Tennessee." Sec. 13 of Act of Incorporation ; and the
27th section of this Act expressly provides, that full privilege is reserved to any corporation of the State, afterwards to connect with the
road,'upon condition that no injury shall be. done to the works of
the Hiwassee Railroad, and that there shall be no inteference with
the privilegeg granted them.
It thus appeats that the Hiwassee Railroad- Company, now called
the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Company, have by virtue
of the Act of 1847, the right of way over a track of two -hundred
feet, (with -.he other privileges granted by the Tennessee Act,) from
the terminus of their road at the Tennessee line to the point which
they- have selected on the Western and Atlantic Railroad, at or
near Dalton ; and that this Act necessarily repeals the Act of 1840,
pro tanto.

To this view of the subject it has been objected1. That there was no provision made by the Act of 1847, for
compliance. with the terms on which only the Act of 1840, could be
repealed, and there has been no such cbmpliance. 2. -That there is
no direct'provision in the Act of 1847, for the repeal of the Act of
1840, and that an Act of the Legislature granting a charter to
corporators, and contracting with them, as such, cannot be repealed
by implication. 3. That the Act of 1847. is unconstitutional.
4. That the Legislature had no authority to make this grant to aforeign. corporation. 6. Our view of the first objection is, that the Act of- 184Q did
provide that just compensation should be made to the complainant
"for their work, investments and improvements," in the event that
it should be repealed; but did not provide that this should be done,
only in one way, viz: by the appointment of assessors, by the repealing Act, who should, together with an equal number appointed
by the Stockholders, value the property, assessthe damage, &c.
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The Act also provided, that such assessors might be appointed by
the Governor of our State, and the Stockholders of the road. The
words are as follows: "If any future General Assembly deem it
advisable, they may repeal this Act; and if it be rtpealed, the
Stockholders shall be paid for their work, investments and improvements, at a fair valuation, to be made by an equal number of disinterested persons, appointed on the part of the State in said repealing Act, or by the Governor, and the said Stockholders."
It follows that if the complainant or the Stockholders of the Company have put "work, investments and improvements" upon their
road, of whose value they have been deprived by the repealing Act
of 1847, they have their claim for the same upon the State; and as
Stockholders may call on the Governor with them to have a "fair
valuation" fixed for their work, investments, &c., and they will
have the right to demand payment for the same.
7.The next objection raises the inquiry, whether or not there is
any difference in the legislative proceeding by which an Act of incorporation (in which the Legislature have reserved the right of
repeal,) is repealed, and that by which any other act is repealed.
It was urged that contracts may be made, and rights may vest
under such an act, and in reliance upon it. This is so 1 but is just
as true of any other act whatever. And he who contracts, or invests under such an act, surely does it with notice, and with a full
sense of the risk he takes.
What difference, then, is there on principle, between the repeal
of such an act and any other, securing important rights and privileges to the citizen, and which may be repealed? And why any
difference in form, or greater solemnities in repealing such an act?
We find no such distinction anywhere drawn. The common law
doctrine is, that "every affirmqtive statuteis arepealbyimplication of
a precedent affirmative statute, so far as it is contrary thereto, for
legesposteriorespriorescontrarasabrogant." Dwarr. on Stat. 673.
In view of this common law principle, we cannot recognize the
distinction taken.
8. It is also objected, that the Act of 1847, being a compact between two States, is void, because contrary to the 10th section of

THE UNION BRANCH RAILROAD COMPANY vs.

the 1st Article of the Constitution of the U. S., which declares that
"no State without the consent of Congress shall lay any duty of
tonnage,' keep troops, or ships of war, in time of peace, enter into
any agreement or compact -with another State, or with a foreign
power, or engage in a war unless actually invaded," &c.
This objection is not well taken:
1. Because, in our opinion, this prohibition applies only to such
an "agreement or compact" as. is in its nature political; or more
properly, perhaps, such as may in any wise conflict with the powers
which the States, by the adoption of the Federal Constitution, have
delegated to the- General Government. This first appears from the
context. Wb find the prohibition, as to exitering into an agreement
or ocompact, associateh with others, preceding and following it in
the same sentence,-and which undoubtedly contemplate political acts
or exercise of sovereign powers, with -which the States, by the
adoption of the great federal compact, have parted; such acts as
duties on tonnage, keeping a standing army or navy, making war,
&c., and in- the language of Judge Story,'when comaenting on
other words in this very clause, we may properly argae that the
sense of each of these terms "is best known by its associbtion
(noscitur a sociis,) to apply to treaties of a political character."
In,the next place, this appears from the reason and- spirit of the
prohibition.,
The framers of'the Constitution clearly intended nothing more by
this clause, than to prohibit the several States from exercising their
authority in any way which night limit, or infringe upon a full and
complete execution by the General Government, of the powers intended to be delegated by the Federal Constitution; because nothing more was to be gained by any further prohibition, no further
benefit to the General Government could have been derived from'it,
and it would have been entirely superfluous and unnecessary..
It was very proper and expedient that no State should have been
allowed to enter into any compact, with another State or foreign
government; which by involving the exercise of powers parted with
by the States, and belonging to the Federal Government, might
operate seriouslr to embarrass that government. But it could work
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no injury to the General Government for such State to make an
agreement with another State, or even a foreign power, which in
no wise conflicted with the authority delegated to the General Government, and tended in no manner to embarrass that government in
the full and completd exercise of its powers.
Unless we take this view of the case, we must hold that a State
without the consent of Congress, can make no sort of contract
whatever with another State. That it cannot sell to another State
any portion of public property, (personal in its character, and not
involving a question of territory,) though it may so sell to individuals.
That, for example, the State of Georgia cannot sell to the State
of Tennessee a surplus engine on its road, or any portion of its
manufactured articles in the Penitentiary, without the* consent of
Congress.
We can see no advantage to be gained by, or benefit in such a
provision, and hence we think it was not intended.
We are supported in this view of the question we are considering
by 'Judge Story, who, in summing up his observations on this clause
of the constitution, remarks as follows: "We have thus passed
through the positive prohibitions introduced, upon the powers of
the States. It wl be observed, that they divide themselves into
two classes; those which are political in their character, as an exercise of sovereignty, and those which more especially regard the
private rights of individuals. In the latter, the prohibition is absolute and universal. In the former, it is sometimes absolute, and
sometimes subjected- to.the consent of Congress." 3 Sory, Cor.
on Con., sec. 1400.
The prohibition which we are considering is one of those which
is "subjected to the consent of Congress," and according to this
eminent jurist, it follows that. it is one of those "which are political in their character."
If we admit, then, that this act of 1847 is a feature in a compact between two States, yet is it nothing more than an agreement,
that the right of way shall be granted to certain citizens for the
purpose of constructing'a Railroad, and is in nowise political in its
character, nor conflicting with the authority of the General Gpvern-
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ment; and therefore we hold that the consent of Congress was not
necessary to its validity.
2. Our next reason for-this opinion is, that the rights of the defendants under the act of 1847, do not depend upon.any compact
between Tennessee and Georgia. It may be assumed that this
act would not have been passed but for the passage of a similar
act by Tennessee, and that both had their origin in an agreement
between the States, unaccompanied with the consent of Congress,
and yet it would seem that this act quoad the rights of the defendants is constitutional and valid. They were no parties to any unconstitutional compact; but as private citizens contracted with the
State of Georgia for this franchise, and upon the faith of this act
proceeded to put their work, investments and improvements upon
the land to which this franchise attached.
9. The other objection is, that the State of Georgia could not
give authoriiy to the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Company as a corporation in the State of Tennessee, to extend their
road into Georgia.
We know of no reason why the State should. not ekercise the
power here questioned. If it have the authority -to grant the iight
of way over any portion of its territory, and hhs not parted with
this right, we see not why it should not grant this fraichise to .persons residing out of the State, as well as to persons within the
State, if, in the bpinion'of the legislature, the public good is thereby
promoted.
It is true, that a corporation can have no legal existence out of
the sovereignty by which it is created; yet it does not ensue that
its existence as an artificial person capable of contracting may not
be recognized elsewhere. In the language of Chief Justice Taney,
in the case of The Bank of A~ugsta vs. Earle, 13 Pet. 588," "'its

residence in one State creates no Insuperable objection to its contracting in another."'
This point is expressly decided in that case by the -Silpreme
Court of the United States, and effectually disposed of in language
like the following: 1 It is sufficient that its" (the corporation's)
"existence as an artificial person in the State of its creation is

